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Introduction
William D. Spaulding
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

One of my formative experiences as a graduate student came during
a break in our afternoon-long first-year proseminar. We had been
discussing the scope of psychology, or rather, listening to two professors debate the scope of psychology. Both the protagonists were
clinical psychologists by training, but one had remained an empirically focused social learning theorist, while the other had pursued
the study of Eastern religion, psychoanalysis, and transpersonal
psychology. As the class milled about, the social learning empiricist
sought some closure on the discussion. "Dick," he said to his transpersonal colleague, "it seems to me that we disagree because in your
view, what I do isn't psychology, and in my view, what you do isn't
science."
We tend to think of the preparadigmatic era of science as characterized by instability and ambiguity in the nature of explanatory
paradigms. As that break revealed, however, we often seem to be as
confused about what we are attempting to understand as how we
should understand it.
Today many believe that over the past decade or so psychology
has become a paradigmatic science (Baars,1986).The new paradigm
is an understanding of behavior in terms of cognitive representations, "the computational metaphor," and a view of biological or-
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ganisms as heterarchically organized information-processing systems interacting with environmental exigencies. If psychology now
has a paradigm, we might expect that the explanatory scope of psychology will be clarified by that paradigm. We might further expect
that this clarification will come as new conceptualizations of ideas
that have evolved over the hundred or so years of psychology's
modern era.
Motivation, emotion, and cognition have all been superordinate
ideas in psychology. Motivation refers to the meaning and purpose
of behavior. Emotion refers to experiential and psychophysiological
phenomena that accompany motivational processes. Cognition refers to organismic activity, not directly observable, which translates
motivation and emotion into observable behavior. Psychological
theory has traditionally attempted to explain events in one of these
domains in terms of events in the other ones. Different theories have
postulated different causal directions and relations between the domains. For example, specific motivational processes are hypothesized to give rise to specific emotional, cognitive, and behavioral
events. The diversity of theories and lack of consensus about which
ones have explanatory superiority are precisely the type of confusion to be expected in a preparadigmatic science. Similarly, lack of
consensus about which processes in which domains constitute
"psychology" illustrates the effect of a poorly defined explanatory
scope. The benefits of a psychological paradigm should include a
new, unified, and integrated understanding of the relationships between motivation, cognition, and emotion.
The cognitive revolution in psychology has fostered a particular
view of cognition as the passing of information back and forth between perceptual, memory, and motor componentsof an integrated
system. Can this view be systematically extended to phenomena
that have traditionally fallen under the rubrics of motivation and
emotion? This volume of the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation is
a collection of views that address that question. Most generally, the
contributions taken together stimulate a hypothesis that the cognitive paradigm has began to move psychology toward a "unified field
theory" of behavior and experience.
The first contribution in this volume, by Herbert Simon, tests
the limits of a pure information-processing paradigm. It is a basic
tenet of information theory that information exists independent of
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the medium by which it is represented. By analyzing the information-processing capabilities of nonbiological systems, or "artificial
intelligence," we may perhaps determine what aspects of motivation and emotion require consideration of the biological substrate of
cognition and which do not. The second contribution, by Muriel
Lezak, raises the same sort of question by focusing on the biological
substrate itself and analyzing constraints and determinations that it
imposes. The third contribution, by Howard Gardner, considers in
tandem the medium and the information it processes and lays a conceptual foundation for making the facts of biological brain science
congruent with the richness and diversity of human behavior and
experience. The fourth contribution, by Johq Bargh and Peter Gollwitzer, elaborates on constructs that potentially incorporate key aspects of human functioning, such as social behavior and creativity,
into a comprehensive, integrated, and cognitive view of motivation.
The final two contributions take the discussion out of purely
theoretical context to address issues in clinical application. Psychopathology and the psychology of adjustment have traditionally provided a conceptual compass to theoretical psychology. We may learn
about normal processes by studying the abnormal. This applies to
abnormalities in the information-processing substrate, as Lezak's
chapter so clearly illustrates, and to problems in the informational
processes that are independent of the substrate. The fifth contribution to this volume, by Nancy Cantor and William Fleeson, describes an integrated cognitive theoretical perspective, which is
potentially useful for understanding, among other things, the differences between effective and ineffective social functioning. The sixth
contribution, by Don Fowles, presents a theoretical framework for
understanding a diversity of severe psychopathology in terms compatible with an integrated cognitive, motivational, and emotional
understanding of normal behavior.
Posters were invited for presentation at the symposium in Lincoln in October 1992. They represent diverse work on integrative
views of motivation, cognition, and emotion. Abstracts of the poster
presentations are included at the end of this volume.
Grateful acknowledgment is made to series editor Richard
Dienstbier and the Nebraska Symposium on Motivation editorial
committee, for their sponsorship and support. Additional thanks
are extended to the contributors, who responded with diligence and
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alacrity to the demands of producing this volume, and to the poster
session authors. Most important, special thanks are due to the faculty and students of the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Department of Psychology, whose scholarly energy inspired this volume
and gave it its direction and focus.
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